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Germany’s agri-biotechnology policy:  
precaution for choice and alternatives 
Karin Boschert and Bernhard Gill 
In Germany, the precautionary principle (PP) is 
a well-established legal principle in environ-
mental law, especially for regulating agri-
biotechnology. This article uses the analytical 
concept of issue-framing to identify different 
views of the PP and how they have informed 
changes in the German regulatory arena. In the 
1990s Germany’s genetically modified (GM) 
crop policy was dominated by a discourse of in-
novation and international competitiveness, 
combined with narrow accounts of precaution. 
In the early 2000s, agro-biotechnology became 
subject to changes in the risk regulatory system, 
new agricultural policies and a broader precau-
tionary scope. After the BSE crisis, German pol-
icy promoted sustainable agriculture and organic 
food, combined with the demand for a precau-
tionary consumer policy and ‘consumer choice’. 
Precaution now encompasses comprehensive 
mandatory labelling and liability rules to protect 
non-GM food production from GM ‘contamina-
tion’ in fields and across the food chain. 
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This paper arises from a research project, ‘Precautionary  
Expertise for GM Crops’ (PEG), funded by the European Com-
mission, Quality of Life programme, socio-economic aspects, 
during 2002–2004 (contract no QLG7-2001-00034). 
HE GERMAN PUBLIC CONTROVERSY 
about the regulation of biotechnology is long-
standing and ongoing. Since 1992, Germany’s 
genetically modified (GM) crop policy was pre-
dominantly driven by neo-liberal ideas of innova-
tion, international competitiveness and a ‘Standort’ 
discourse about preserving Germany as a business 
location. Regulation was based on a ‘science’ ra-
tionale, that is, any restrictions must be justified by 
evidence of environmental risk or hazard, within a 
narrow interpretation of ‘adverse effects’. This  
approach ignored broader precautionary demands of 
many biotech critics (Dreyer and Gill, 2000). 
This situation changed in the year 2000. After the 
BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or mad 
cow disease) crisis, agro-biotechnology became 
caught up in broader efforts to reform agricultural 
and consumer policy. ‘Precaution’ has taken on a 
broader meaning, playing a prominent role in politi-
cal deliberation and legislation. 
This paper analyses regulatory developments for 
German agro-biotechnology during 2002–2004,  
especially different views of the precautionary prin-
ciple (PP) in the regulatory arena. It asks: how do 
policy stances and expert practices relate to precau-
tion? The findings are based on a research project 
that included a stakeholder workshop (Boschert and 
Gill, 2003), 24 interviews and extensive documen-
tary research (Boschert and Gill, 2004). 
The article uses the analytical concept of issue-
framing as an ordering device. According to Rein and 
Schön (1993), “framing is a way of selecting, organ-
ising, interpreting, and making sense of a complex  
reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing, 
persuading and acting”. In this sense, different pol-
icy views are framed by specific ‘story-lines’ that 
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selectively problematise certain aspects of socio-
material reality, according to Maarten Hajer. These 
story-lines define problems and solutions, while 
foreclosing alternative strategies and actions. 
Likewise, the emergence of new story-lines can 
re-order understanding, can provide for a different 
access to a certain issue and thus facilitate policy 
change (Hajer, 1995). The concept of framing can 
thus be used to illuminate policy conflicts in the 
regulatory arena, as well as to provide clues for how 
to understand recent policy changes. 
Different accounts of precaution 
In Germany, the PP is a well-established legal prin-
ciple in environmental law, especially for regulating 
agri-biotechnology. Although the PP is widely ac-
cepted in Germany as a basis for decision-making 
with respect to GM crops, there are different views 
of its interpretation and implementation. In the  
German biotech controversy, various accounts of 
precaution can be identified in policy statements, 
documents or specific practices. These accounts are 
informed by different judgements on scientific un-
certainty, the normative baseline for risk compari-
son, the role of scientific expertise or different 
models of agrifood production. The different  
accounts arise in both explicit and implicit ways. 
This article uses the analytical concept of framing 
to cluster the findings in a three-tiered issue-framing 
categorisation (Table 1). These framings broadly 
correspond with stakeholder positions in the PP. 
‘Innovation’ frame Within this frame, biotechnol-
ogy is considered an innovative problem-solving 
tool, which therefore should be promoted. This view 
can be linked to the following account of precaution. 
The PP is a political idea (politische Leitidee) that 
precedes legislative action, for instance, a general 
requirement for pre-market risk assessment and au-
thorisation. Risk management is justified only by 
‘evidence of risk’, whereby precaution becomes 
merely prevention. Questions about uncertainty are 
often dismissed as speculative. The state of knowl-
edge about the technology is generally assumed to 
be high and sufficient. 
It is assumed that biotechnology poses no specific 
risks beyond conventional ones, though this needs to 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. ‘Sound science’ 
is understood as the appropriate tool for objective 
decision-making and no factors other than science 
are considered. The level of protection, that is, the 
type or extent of unacceptable damage, lies in con-
ventional standards in agriculture. This frame is 
supported by industry, major science organisations 
and parts of the administration, such as the Robert-
Koch Institute (RKI), which led the German Compe-
tent Authority (CA) for biotechnology regulation 
until March 2004. 
‘Risk’ frame Within this frame, risk and safety 
considerations are pivotal. In this sense, biotechnol-
ogy is viewed as a risk-creating, but also potentially 
a problem-solving, technology. In any case, gov-
ernment should consider alternative solutions posing 
lower risks to the environment. This differs from the 
innovation frame specially with respect to judge-
ments on scientific uncertainty and normative cri-
teria. The PP is understood as a legal principle that 
needs to be considered at all stages of approval.  
Recourse to precaution in risk assessment or risk 
management is justified on grounds of uncertainty 
and knowledge gaps, given that biotechnological 
effects on the environment cannot be fully assessed. 
The PP is thus also regarded as a decision-making 
tool triggered in cases of uncertainty. It is further-
more claimed that decisions cannot be based only  
on science, given that there needs to be a societal 
consensus with respect to protection levels and  
acceptable risks. In a similar vein, it is argued that 
biotechnological applications should be judged rela-
tive to sustainability standards. This broader under-
standing of the PP is supported by critical actors, 
such as the environmental agency (UBA), though 
they are not fundamentally antagonistic to biotech. 
‘Alternatives’ frame Within this frame, preventing 
biotechnology is pivotal because it is perceived as 
perpetuating and creating problems, and so should 
be banned, or at least heavily restricted. For the 
views belonging to this category, the PP is more 
than just a legal principle. It is a framework or mind-
set for being precautionary: GM organisms (GMOs) 
should not be released into the environment. This 
strong precaution is justified on grounds of systemic 
uncertainties, for instance, unpredictable and uncon-
trollable effects. 
From this precautionary frame, new technologies 
should be considered only on the basis of analysing 
problems and needs. Moreover, new technologies 
should be chosen in an open, transparent and demo-
cratic fashion; they should provide an absolute im-
provement over conventional practices. Such 
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Cable 1. Framings and contested views on precaution
ssue framing ‚Innovation’ 
– making agbiotech possible 
‘Risks’ 
– making agbiotech safe- 
‘Alternatives’ 
– preventing agbiotech- 
P in general Political idea and general legal  
principle 
Legal principle and specific decision-
making tool 
Mindset, legal principle and quality tool 
rigger for PP Positive scientific evidence of risk Uncertainty and knowledge gaps Systemic uncertainty 
ncertainty No basis for preventative action,  
risks will be handled by risk-
management practices 
Uncertainty often dismissed as 
speculative concept 
Basis for preventative action (ban only 
last resort) 
Uncertainty changes risk research,  
risk-assessment (RA) and risk-
management (RM) practices 
Uncertainty can be reduced through 
research (‘need to know more’) and  
risk-reducing measures 
Basis for preventative action including 
banning, since uncertainty cannot be 
reduced 
tate of 
nowledge 
‘There is considerable knowledge 
about GM crops’ 
‘We do not know enough about the 
effects’ 
‘We don’t know what we don’t know’ 
vidence of 
amage/ 
aseline 
Conventional standards in  
agriculture applied (‘as safe as 
conventional products’)  
Preferably higher sustainability and 
nature conservation standards applied 
(relative improvement) 
New technologies should only be 
considered on the basis of absolute 
improvement of practices, that is, better 
than the best available production system
ost-effective 
easures 
Intervention needs to be cost- 
effective and ‘practical’ 
Intervention focuses most of all on  
risk avoidance, yet (cost) limits  
accepted  
Possible costs should not hinder 
intervention on the grounds of safety 
ost–benefit 
nalysis 
In general cost–benefit analysis 
rejected because these decisions 
should be left to the market: 
‘acceptable social demand no legal 
criterion’.  
Cost–benefit analysis as basis for 
decision-making on risks 
However, assessment confined to  
direct and indirect environmental  
effects 
Alternative solutions posing lower risk 
on the environment should be  
considered  
Cost–benefit analysis rejected because: 
risk avoidance is highest priority, and 
society should not be forced to bear the 
costs of expensive technology 
assessments 
Problem analysis first! 
Demands a fourth hurdle, eg a full test 
for socio-economic need 
urden of proof Proof of risk lies with regulators 
However ‘reasonable’ public safety 
demands on technology introducer 
accepted 
Principally lies with the regulator 
However, uncertainty and knowledge 
gaps may require reversal of burden of 
proof 
Proof of safety and need lies with GM-
introducing companies 
cience Science as tool for objective  
decision-making 
’Politicisation of science’ to be  
avoided 
Science alone does not provide 
adequate basis for risk decisions 
a) Scientific evidence may not be 
available 
b) Risk assessment (RA)and risk 
management (RM) are influenced  
by a society’s moral concepts about 
protection levels 
Science alone (but what science?) does 
not provide basis for safety and need 
decisions 
Question of GMO is beyond science and 
foremost political 
’Scientification’ hides political character 
of decision 
ther legitimate 
actors 
Not relevant in RA procedure 
Individual preferences and societal 
concerns mainly delegated to market 
arena 
Values necessarily come into research 
and RA and RM procedure (‘What 
effects are considered to be damage 
and acceptable?’).  
Socio-economic and socio-cultural 
effects of producing, distributing and 
consuming  
articipation Decisions should be left to experts 
(scientists) 
’Descientification’ should be  
prevented 
Experts’ judgement should represent 
scientific controversies 
Decisions need to be transparent and 
open for lay people’s concerns 
Decisions should be taken 
‘democratically’, usually translated into 
demand for new decision-making 
procedures that are more transparent 
and participatory 
ustainable 
griculture (SA) 
Biotech allows more sustainable 
agricultural practices  
Biotech might provide a tool for SA Biotech contradicts SA 
iotech in general Problem-solving technology Risk-creating but possibly problem-
solving technology, alternatives need  
to be considered 
Technology that perpetuates problems 
and causes new ones 
iotech risk in 
eneral 
No specific risk beyond conventional 
ones 
’No more or less effects than any 
other things we do’ 
Basic risks and uncertainties 
acknowledged 
Stress on ‘new quality’ of 
biotechnological interventions 
Potentially fatal consequences 
anticipated 
oexistence Not part of a precautionary rationale As part of a precautionary rationale, In case of cultivation, a precautionary cience and Public Policy August 2005  287 
Coexistence is an economic  
concept, not related to safety 
coexistence allows keeping natural 
spaces GM-free and making individual 
safety judgements 
rationale requires coexistence, which 
allows for keeping natural spaces GM-
free and making individual safety 
judgements 
A precautionary rationale also includes 
economic damage, in terms of 
‘safeguarding alternatives’ 
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decisions cannot be left to scientists alone because 
GMOs lie beyond risk assessment; the issue is primar-
ily political. The PP is thus also used as a principle for  
introducing quality standards in environmental  
decision-making, especially for promoting benign 
alternatives. This broad account of the PP, emphasi-
sing alternatives, includes environmental NGOs, 
organic farmers and other radical critics of agri-
biotechnology. 
In Germany, specific accounts of the PP informed 
the GM crop approval procedure in the 1990s. 
Within the official regulatory arena there was a clash 
in understanding, especially between the UBA on 
one side, and the national CA (RKI) with its scien-
tific advisory committee (ZKBS) on the other side. 
The regulatory procedure excluded fundamental 
concerns of sustainability and pluralist/democratic 
decision-making, as exemplified by the second fram-
ing, and even more so the third one. 
For instance, the RKI regarded conventional, in-
tensive agricultural practices as a baseline for evalu-
ating the effects of GM crops. That is, as long as 
they did not pose a higher or additional environ-
mental risk compared to conventional plants,  
their effects were deemed to be acceptable. In this 
way, the RKI considered the development of pest 
resistance (that is, regarding Bt insecticidal maize), 
or indirect effects of long-term use of herbicides 
(such as Roundup) as acceptable — a position that 
UBA did not support (Sauter and Meyer, 2000).  
As another example, the RKI regarded comprehen-
sive labelling simply as a response to marketing  
constraints, not as a science-based precautionary 
measure. 
By basing its decision on a narrow interpretation 
of the relevant law, the CA excluded broader envi-
ronmental and societal concerns, such as concepts of 
sustainability and biodiversity in agriculture and 
food production. Regulation was limited to ‘sound 
scientific arguments’ alone, while other precaution-
ary accounts were dismissed as ‘political’ or deemed 
irrelevant or speculative. From the hegemonic ‘in-
novation’ framing, a narrow account of precaution 
thus rendered very difficult any mediation of con-
flicts among regulators, as well as between them and 
public concerns. 
Precautionary consumer protection 
Agrarwende 
Until the late 1990s, the regulatory arena remained 
relatively closed to broader accounts of precaution. 
This general hegemonic policy framing continued 
even after the 1998 electoral change. After 16 years 
of Conservative/Liberal rule, the former Govern-
ment was replaced by a ‘Red–Green’ coalition be-
tween the Social Democratic Party and the Green 
Party. 
Green pressures were eventually manifest in  
national biotechnology policies. In the year 2000, 
the PP was invoked to suspend market approval of 
Bt maize 176, on the grounds that “new scientific 
evidence” put into doubt the safety of the crop.1 The 
role of the UBA, an institution known for supporting 
more rigorous risk assessment schemes, was 
strengthened and was given equal status with the 
RKI. 
New issues were becoming prominently controver-
sial, such as nature conservation considerations in 
relation to GM crops. Out-crossing of genes into 
neighbouring fields, and GMO contamination of non-
GM products, started to become legal and economic 
problems. At the European level, the deregulatory 
phase of the mid-1990s had turned into the opposite: 
stricter European Union (EU) regulation now sup-
ported national demands for more precaution. 
Major changes in the German regulatory arena  
resulted from the biggest post-war food and agricul-
tural crisis. At the end of 2000, the BSE crisis sent 
the agricultural and food-related system into turmoil. 
The crisis led both the health and agricultural min-
isters to resign their posts, and the Agriculture  
Ministry to change its focus from agriculture to  
consumer protection. 
More importantly, the crisis stimulated a restruc-
turing of the German risk regulation system and 
triggered a fundamental turn in agricultural policies. 
Under the term Agrarwende, agricultural policy now 
gave priority to sustainable production, consumer 
concerns and food safety. Industry and the Red–
Green Government had previously negotiated plans 
for a large-scale, three-year GM cultivation pro-
gramme, but this initiative was now dropped. 
It was eventually replaced by a public debate, the 
Diskurs grüne Gentechnik, now under the political 
lead of the new Consumer Protection Minister Renate 
Künast, a Green Party member. After the re-election 
of the Government in 2002, the political responsibil-
ity for agro-biotechnology was wholly shifted from 
the biotech-friendly Ministry of Health to the new 
Ministry for Consumer Protection, Food and Agricul-
ture (BMVEL). The CA was subsequently changed 
from the RKI to the Federal Agency for Consumer 
Protection and Food Safety (BVL), a newly created 
subordinate agency of the BMVEL. 
As promoted by the BMVEL, the new GM policy 
line was framed around Agrarwende and ‘consumer 
By basing its decision on a narrow 
interpretation of the relevant law, 
until 2002 the Competent Authority 
excluded broader environmental and 
societal concerns, such as concepts of 
sustainability and biodiversity in 
agriculture and food production 
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choice’. A new way to conceive agro-biotechnology 
applications was officially promoted by linkage to 
the broader problematique of agriculture and food 
production. For the sake of agricultural change, Min-
ister Künast strongly promoted organic agriculture 
as a model for more sustainable forms of farming. 
Given the problems in conventional agricultural 
production, new technologies needed to demonstrate 
their contribution toward the goal of sustainable agri-
cultural change. More importantly, new techno-
logical applications needed to stand the test with 
consumers and producers and their food/feed/seed 
choices. As a political baseline, the introduction of 
new technologies should not compromise consumer 
choice. This choice was seen as being about more 
than simply GMO versus non-GMO. Rather it con-
cerned social preferences about what we eat, how we 
live, and what farming structures we want and sup-
port (Künast, 2001). 
From environmental risk to coexistence 
Not surprisingly, this new framing of the issue was 
highly contested. It openly politicised the issue of 
technology introduction and opened up the policy 
arena to broader, more fundamental discussions and 
accounts of precaution, as exemplified by the third 
framing of agri-biotechnology. Rather than focus on 
environmental risk alone, the new discourse empha-
sised wider options for agri-food systems (for in-
stance, Öko-Institut, 2002a; 2002b). 
In particular, the Agrarwende advocated an  
increase in organic cultivation to 20% of the total. 
Unintended gene flow from GM crops to non-GM 
crops took on an entirely new character in relation to 
demands for consumer choice and new agricultural 
policies. How can those who want to guarantee con-
sumer choice prevent crop-to-crop gene flow? How 
can ‘contamination’ be prevented along the food 
chain? Even more urgently, how could organic cul-
tivation be increased if those different forms of land 
cultivation could not coexist in close proximity? 
These issues of segregation, and conflicting inter-
ests between non-GM and GM production, became 
increasingly important in the policy community. 
Such issues were regarded as a central problem to be 
solved in future legislation (BMVEL, 2002). Fol-
lowing the recommendations of the ex-
pert/stakeholder debate, Diskurs grüne Gentechnik 
in 2002, coexistence and consumer choice were 
identified as the new policy goals of the re-elected 
Red–Green Government. 
Expertise, coexistence and the PP 
In the last few years, new developments have fos-
tered stronger accounts of precaution, opening up 
space for the ‘risks’ and ‘alternatives’ framings in 
the regulatory field. There is a broadening of re-
search into agro-environmental effects of GMOs; 
alternatives to biotechnology are being promoted as 
more sustainable practices of land cultivation.2 
In Germany’s new law, the composition of the 
scientific advisory body ZKBS has been broadened 
to include additional expertise in farming, consumer 
protection and nature conservation. Environmental 
expertise in risk assessment has been shifted from 
the UBA to the nature protection agency, the Bunde-
samt für Naturschutz (BFN), an institution known 
for applying the PP stringently. The expertise of 
non-mainstream scientific research institutions, such 
as the Öko-Institut, has gained a standing in GMO 
risk judgements. Furthermore, different precaution-
ary accounts inform the risk judgements of the new 
CA, the BVL.3 
In Germany, debates over the issues of choice and 
coexistence have reframed the former agronomic–
environmental issues. Moreover, the change in sub-
ject and discourse has brought in new actors, such as 
the organic and conventional farmers, and created 
new coalition dynamics (Boschert, 2005). Risk and 
safety issues remain important and disputed themes 
of precaution. However, precaution takes on a 
broader meaning, now that agro-biotech is embed-
ded in a more complex debate on consumer and  
producer choice and coexistence. 
For coexistence measures, EC Directive 2001/18 
was amended so that member states can specify  
protective measures to avoid the adventitious pres-
ence of GMOs in non-GM products. BMVEL has 
based its approach on that legal authority. Although 
coexistence does not constitute an (official) part of 
risk regulation, precaution has been linked to the 
choice and coexistence discourse in many ways.  
The debate about coexistence rules again illustrates 
the disputed nature of expertise, scientific evidence 
and regulatory measures by the three frames in  
question. 
‘Coexistence’ denotes compromise measures to 
ensure ‘the freedom of choice’ to produce and  
consume GM, conventional or organic crops. Major 
arguments arise as to the basis on which such a 
compromise could be reached. Managing coexis-
tence under circumstances of gene transfer is dis-
puted on the question of thresholds and 
responsibilities. GMO proponents define coexistence 
on the basis of ‘practical thresholds’, that is, allow-
ing high contamination, whereas the opponents un-
derstand coexistence as clear-cut alternatives, that is, 
GMO-free meaning 100% free. 
From the start, environmental NGOs emphasised 
that coexistence was impossible, since GMO con-
tamination threatens the right to choose. Later, how-
ever, they intervened in the debate by demanding 
stringent rules. For environmental NGOs, coexis-
tence is an environmental and ethical issue, not just 
an economic one. Beyond economic risk to non-
GMO farming, outcrossing or unwanted spread of 
reproductive material poses an environmental risk, 
they argue that this spread would be irreversible. On 
grounds of precaution, introgression of GMOs,  
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especially in seed or ‘conservation areas’, should be 
avoided, not just minimised. 
Strict coexistence rules are thus fully part of the 
precautionary rationale, as they alone provide the 
necessary conditions that would allow product with-
drawal in case of damage, to keep certain areas free 
from GMOs and to protect alternatives. Accord-
ingly, environmental NGOs, together with the or-
ganic farmers, demand the strict application of the 
‘polluter pays’ principle. This would mean that the 
GMO introducer would have full liability for pre-
venting and compensating any damage, along with 
low thresholds for seed contamination, that is, the 
level of detectability. 
Künast and the BMVEL have strongly supported 
the demand for strict coexistence rules, to safeguard 
non-GM forms of farming and to “prevent war in the 
villages”, for instance, disputes among farmers.  
Coexistence rules would become central once culti-
vation started, so Künast argued the need for clear 
legislation, beyond voluntary agreements. Such rules 
were included in the new bill (GenTG) for transpos-
ing EC Directive 2001/18 into national law, formu-
lated by the administration and passed by Parliament 
at the end of 2004.4 
That law called upon a “duty of precautionary 
practices” (Vorsorgepflicht) to strengthen damage 
prevention and to safeguard coexistence. The  
law obliges GMO operators to take precautionary 
action to prevent an “essential reduction of value” 
being inflicted on non-GMO crops. Most con-
troversially, planters of GMO crops are held liable 
for economic damage to adjacent non-GM fields 
even if they follow planting instructions and other 
rules. 
For the BMVEL, coexistence is not primarily a 
matter of safety considerations, although the Minis-
try concedes that there are links to risk assessment, 
with respect to monitoring and traceability; rather, 
coexistence is about fundamental choices and diver-
sity. In this respect, even nature protection is framed 
as a coexistence issue by allowing a ”GM-free  
Nature”, in particular with regard to ”ecologically 
sensitive areas”. Most importantly, and reflected in 
their framing of the PP, precaution allows for an in-
dividual choice in terms of what is regarded as being 
better for the environment (for instance, organic agri-
culture) and human safety. 
However, agro-biotechnology proponents dis-
agree. They argue that coexistence is a purely eco-
nomic issue having nothing to do with risk/safety 
considerations, much less the precautionary princi-
ple. For them “coexistence is feasible” on the basis 
of practical (that is, high) contamination thresholds 
and “reasonable measures” to prevent the influx of 
GM material into neighbouring fields. From this 
“innovation” perspective, they claim that the new 
law makes unreasonable demands and imposes harsh 
economic penalties thus threatening GM cultivation; 
they criticise it as a “biotech prevention law” and a 
“blow to research”. 
As the analysis shows, the precautionary principle 
is caught up in the continuous political–scientific 
controversy about agro-biotechnology. In this way, 
the coexistence issue extends the scientific debate 
and political controversy on the PP, that is, what is 
meant by precaution for decision-making. What 
needs to be protected — productivist innovations, 
the environment or alternatives — remains subject to 
fierce debates.5 Yet clearly, policy shifts across the 
three framings of precaution have occurred as novel 
precautionary ‘risk’ and ‘alternatives’ elements are 
introduced into legislation, especially in precaution-
ary approaches to coexistence. 
PP linking politics with the market 
With coexistence rules, new biotech regulation 
should henceforth not only protect health and the 
environment but also safeguard socio-political de-
mands of consumer choices and agricultural diver-
sity. This new focus on ‘consumer choices and 
rights’ has widened the arena for the PP from the 
political to the market arena. 
The reorientation towards consumers responded 
to significant shifts in market demand. Producers’ 
agendas are being led by products catering to indi-
vidual tastes, rather than mass consumption. The 
“consumer as a chooser” (Gabriel and Lang, 1995) 
actively selects and judges products in the light of 
individual preferences. The issue of how food is 
produced, handled and processed has gained in im-
portance as products are increasingly enriched by 
individualistic, symbolic meanings. This in turn has 
created profitable commercial opportunities for 
commodities produced on different quality stan-
dards, for instance, with respect to animal welfare, 
sustainable land cultivation or non-GM. 
In this sense, the GM products currently under 
debate, so-called ‘first-generation’ products with 
changed agronomic traits, can be classified as inno-
vations within an older, Fordist bulk-commodity 
production system not yet adapted to post-Fordist 
variations of consumer taste (Harvey, 1990). Such a 
system contradicts the very notion of consumer 
With coexistence rules, new biotech 
regulation should not only protect 
health and the environment but also 
safeguard socio-political demands of 
consumer choices and agricultural 
diversity: this means that the PP has 
moved from the political to the market 
arena 
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choice, which would require a system to separate 
various production and distribution channels in order 
to identity/preserve food products.6 ‘First-
generation’ GM products have become vulnerable 
within the neo-liberal hegemonic framework for ex-
actly this reason: The neo-liberal discourse empha-
sises efficiency and individual liberty, while 
opposing state interference with innovation, thus 
precluding choices of market participants. 
In this situation, agbiotech-critical politics could 
appropriate ‘consumer choice’ from its neo-liberal 
context and instead give it an opposite meaning. 
They asserted the state’s duty to shape innovation in 
a way that empowers consumers to choose or oppose 
specific developments and innovations. In the post-
BSE phase of new consumer policies, the demand 
for coexistence, and the story-lines of “safeguarding 
the alternatives in agriculture and food production”, 
have strengthened the basis of the agbiotech-critical 
coalition. 
Environmental groups moved away from their 
negative ‘risk’ discourse on biotechnology, to pro-
mote alternative market developments, especially 
organic farming. Other policy actors followed that 
lead towards protecting non-GM forms of farming; 
even the powerful mainstream farmers’ organisation 
(DBV) moved towards the side of the agro-biotech 
sceptics, on the basis of economic arguments. Thus 
precautionary measures, including labelling 
schemes, liability rules, crop separation regimes and 
so on, go beyond political considerations; such 
measures also result from shifting market relations 
and self-perceived economic interests of market  
participants. 
Conclusion 
A major crisis in the German agri-food system, BSE, 
has led to significant institutional and policy changes 
with a profound impact on agbiotech regulation. As 
the most important result, the official risk debate has 
shifted. While public concerns have always gone 
beyond biophysical risks to include alternatives in 
agriculture, the Agrarwende has finally pushed these 
issues into the regulatory arena. On the basis of pre-
caution, new biotech regulation should protect not 
only health and the environment, but also safeguard 
socio-political demands of consumer choices and 
agricultural diversity. 
The analytical concept of issue-framing helped to 
illuminate the policy conflicts by providing tools to 
map different accounts of precaution surrounding 
GMOs. Equally, issue framing provided an explana-
tion for the policy shift. The emphasis on framing 
and discourse showed how new issues, such as 
choice and coexistence, shifted attention from one 
practice to another — from innovation to agricul-
ture. This shift strengthened some political argu-
ments over others, for instance, more versus less 
regulation. This process eventually opened up ways 
for Germany to develop biotech policies based on 
broader accounts of precaution. 
Notes 
1. This decision was taken against the advice of the Zentrale 
Kontrollstelle für biologische Sicherheit (ZKBS), the Scientific 
Advisory Committee on Biological Safety. According to the 
ZKBS, the information did not show any new evidence of 
risk, and some of the studies were methodologically flawed. 
2. This is illustrated by the field trial case of a GM apple in 
2003. After a favourable decision of the scientific advisory 
body (ZKBS) on the case, in October 2003, the BMVEL 
stopped the trial from going ahead. There was no official jus-
tification for the measure, though Green parliamentary 
members argued that “the development of alternative meas-
ures would be more promising“. 
3. In the 1990s, the German CA always supported approval of 
GM products in the EU regulatory committee. By contrast, 
since 2003, the German CA has always abstained in such 
EU decisions (FoEE, 2005). There are ongoing arguments 
amongst German regulators as to what constitutes a proper 
risk judgement, reflecting different issue-framings of the  
national authorities. Abstention thus reflects their  
disagreements. 
4. Liability and coexistence regulation were highly disputed. 
The second, Opposition-dominated law-making chamber, 
the Bundesrat, proposed almost 100 changes to the Gov-
ernment proposal. To avoid lengthy conciliation procedures 
between the two chambers, the Red–Green Government 
split the law such that it no longer needed consent in the 
Bundesrat. The remaining issues, such as administrative 
rules for “good agricultural practices“ and rules for disclosing 
fields cultivated with GM crops, will have to be clarified in a 
second law. 
5. In the most extreme polarisation of the issue, the PP is even 
used for both support and opposition to agro-biotechnology. 
For instance, during the Diskurs grüne Gentechnik one of 
the experts claimed that a precautionary approach towards 
land cultivation demanded the use of biotechnological  
applications. 
6. New GM products with supposed ‘advantages for the con-
sumer’ (for instance, potatoes for more healthy fried chips) 
may have a better market position also, because here, right 
from the start, innovators and producers have an interest in 
keeping products separate and preventing mixtures, which 
critics call “pollution”. Yet even there the problem of pollen 
contamination and seed germination remains acute. 
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